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ARTICLES

A CIVILIAN FOR OUR TIMES: JUSTICE ALBERT
TATE, JR.
Mack E. Barham*
Justice Albert Tate, Jr. was born in 1920 into a family that resided
in the Ville Platte area for eight generations. He received a Bachelor
of Arts degree from George Washington University in 1941. After serving
with distinction during World War II in the Counter Intelligence Corps
in the Far East, he returned to his education at Yale University, receiving
his L.L.B. degree in 1947. In 1948, he received a certificate for Civil
Code studies from the LSU School of Law. Justice Tate practiced for
six years in Ville Platte before his election to the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal. He became the presiding judge of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal in June, 1960 and served in that circuit for ten years.
In 1970, he was elected Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana to replace the retiring Chief Justice Fournet. He served on
the supreme court until his retirement from that court and his appointment to the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 30,
1979. Justice Tate's nine years of service on the Supreme Court of
Louisiana came at a crucial time for the highest court of this State.
In the 1960's and early 1970's, the United States Supreme Court,
under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, was moving rapidly
in protecting the constitutional rights of individuals. Landmark decisions
were coming out of that Court, overturning jurisprudence regarding
searches and seizures, confessions, line ups, arrests, guilty pleas, and
nearly every other area of the criminal law process. While most of this
paper concerns Justice Tate's views as a judge in the civil law area, it
would be remiss not to point out the great impact that he had as a
member of the court by demanding adherence to the new legal principles
of the Warren Court, and by recognizing the binding authority of the
United States Supreme Court decisions in the area of criminal law.
The views expressed in these opinions of the Warren Court were
not readily received by the lawyers or the general public in Louisiana.
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It was difficult for the elected judges of Louisiana to adopt these
principles and abide by the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. In fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court itself was slow to feel
compelled to follow the highest court of the land. A review of the
Louisiana Reporter shows that from 1968 to 1970 the Louisiana Supreme
Court decided numerous criminal cases by a six-to-one vote, this writer
being the lone dissent. With Justice Tate's addition to the court in 1970,
these types of cases were more often decided by a five-to-two voting
posture. Upon Justice Dixon's arrival, the resistant majority was weakened to four votes. Finally, the addition of Justice Calogero to the
Louisiana Supreme Court swung the dissent into the majority which
henceforth adhered to the United States Supreme Court dictates.
Justice Tate's convictions and persuasive abilities largely influenced
these new members of the Louisiana Supreme Court. This writer will
be ever grateful to Justice Tate for his invaluable assistance, his quality
of leadership, and his ability to work with his colleagues on the court
towards the goal of abiding by the United States Supreme Court. During
this conflict, the morale of the minority was strengthened by the federal
court cases which upheld the dissenting opinions by granting post-conviction relief to Louisiana defendants. Unfortunately, the long delay
which resulted upon remand often made it impossible for a new trial
to be had. Thus, the minority recognized that the more rapidly that
the Louisiana courts resolved their legal issues in accordance with the
federal mandate, the greater the likelihood of adjudication by the original
trial and the conviction of the guilty.
Justices who stood strong in this position faced severe criticism from
the electorate. In fact, one of the justices endured a bitter election battle
which he won only with great effort and difficulty. It is appropriate to
introduce this reflection on Justice Tate's work with a statement about
his courage in carrying out his convictions and in discharging his responsibilities. Justice Tate was a man of great intellect. He was an
honorable person. He was a courageous fighter. Most people who knew
him would describe his as a kind and mild-tempered person. However,
observing him with his colleagues in the conference room of the Supreme
Court, vigorously advocating his position, gave another perspective to
the persona of Justice Tate. He could be adamant, uncompromising,
aggressive, and forceful when confronted with opposing and-in his
opinion-invalid, legal views.
Justice Tate was similarly invaluable in creating the resurgence of
the civilian tradition of Louisiana at the Louisiana Supreme Court. As
both a catalyst and response to this movement, Justice Tate penned
numerous articles examining civilian methodology, the influence of policy
on judicial decisions, the role of the judge, and the effect of common
law in Louisiana, as well as the wealth of opinions which applied the
principles so carefully articulated in his scholarly works. In one of his
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earliest articles, "Policy" in JudicialDecisions,' Tate discussed the considerations which influence judicial decisions when there is no positive
law to resolve a dispute. In such a circumstance, according to Justice
Tate, the judge should decide both what is best for the community as
well as what is a fair solution to the problem at hand. By way of
example, he cited the opinion of Sanders v. Sanders,2 which he wrote
for the First Circuit Court of Appeal, where such policy considerations
were weighed to choose between two conflicting statutes.3 According to
Tate, an additional aspect of policy considerations would come into play
for every decision, not just the unprovided-for case. That is, once a
policy choice has been made, a judge should not apply the rule by rote,
but in accordance with the rule's underlying policy.
Justice Tate believed that an unjust result in a particular case was
more than likely due to misapplication of the law, not to a law itself
unjust. He frequently used Louisiana Civil Code article 21 to reach a
fair result when a forced and mechanical application of another law
might have resulted in inequity. Such a course was justified by his belief
that one aspect of the civilian judge's duty is to harmonize an isolated
statute with the rest of the codal scheme.
In his article, The Law-Making Function of the Judge,4 Tate outlined
four such functions, having concluded that "law-improvement functions
are an inescapable part of the duties of an appellate court." 5 He describes
those functions as choosing the law or rule in the unprovided-for case,
synthesizing the new law with the rest of the Code, revising the law to
reflect social changes, and interpreting the law to reflect legislative will.
The first function, choosing the law-rule, is necessary in the unprovided6
for case, as discussed in Sanders.
The judge must also synthesize new legislation within the established
body of law. 7 This second function recognizes that many issues are often

1. 20 La. L. Rev. 62 (1959).
2. 85 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
3. Sanders involved a contest between two heirs, one of whom sought reimbursement
of their mother's funeral expenses from the estate. His brother opposed the claim, arguing
that it had prescribed under La. Civ. Code art. 3538 (1870) (current art. 3494, 3-year
prescription of open accounts). The first brother urged that funeral debts are substantially
different from open accounts as they are a charge on the estate. From this perspective,
prescription does not run as long as the estate is not settled. Another alternative facing
the court was the prescriptive period for personal actions of ten years under art. 3276
(1870) (current art. 3499). The court felt it would be unjust in both the instant and future
cases to require an heir to sue the estate within three years to recover funeral expenses.
4. 28 La. L. Rev. 211 (1968).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 216. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
7. 28 La. L. Rev. at 218-20. In his article, Tate points out several revised areas of
the law which have raised new issues for the courts. For example, the married women's
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affected by a new law, but are not directly controlled by it. Without
direction from the legislature, the courts must decide these incidental
issues based on the intended policy of the new law. To do anything
less, Tate believed, "would abdicate the judicial function by simply
applying the later legislation on some mechanical rule that the latest
enactment must always supersede all earlier statutes even arguably affected, without attaching any relevance to whether this later enactment
was really intended to apply." '
The third function of the appellate judge, according to Justice Tate,
is law revision. 9 This activity is most prevalent in the area of private
law doctrines which must be updated as the mores of society change.
One reason for the courts' performance of this task is that the legislature
simply does not have the time or inclination to continuously update
every area of the law. Instead, the courts revise the law, if necessary,
to resolve the dispute at hand, and the legislature reacts either by not
acting or by passing a statute to reverse a judicial revision. One of the
foremost areas of law revision associated with Judge Tate is that of
tort and strict liability, as illustrated by his decision in the landmark
0
case of Loescher v. Parr.1
By expanding the notion of fault to include
liability for damages caused by defects of which the owner was not
aware, Tate significantly broadened the grounds on which plaintiffs could
sue. This outcome was justified by a thorough and meticulous exegesis
of Civil Code article 2317. The result was to imbue that article with a
utility demanded by social and technological advances.
In a more recent work," Tate discussed another case where he
believed that law-revision would have been appropriate. In Loyacano v.
Loyacano,' 2 he joined the majority on original hearing and adopted the
opinion by Justice Dennis on rehearing as a concurrence. Loyacano
involved a challenge to the constitutionality of Louisiana Civil Code
article 160 which granted alimony to a divorced wife in need. The
husband claimed that the article was blatantly gender-based and violated
the equal protection guaranteed by both state and federal law, although
he did not seek alimony for himself. The original majority considered

emancipation acts called into question the tort liability between spouses and/or to third
parties. Another example arose out of the 1960 legislation which revised La. Civ. Code
art. 2103 (1870) (current art. 1804, 1805) to provide for the enforcement of contribution
among joint tortfeasors. The new article did not address the situation where the other
;pouse had been the joint tortfeasor, invoking interspousal immunity.
8. 28 La. L. Rev. at 220.
9. Id.at 221-22.
10. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
11. Tate, The "New" Judicial Solution: Occasions for and Limits to Judicial Creativity, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 877 (1980).
12. 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978).
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the social setting at the time Article 160 was enacted and found that
there was no intent to discriminate; the idea of alimony for necessitous
husbands simply did not occur to the legislators. Using Article 21, the
court found that a necessitous husband would not be denied alimony
in spite of the language of Article 160. The husband's request for
rehearing contended that the court had impermissibly engaged in judicial
legislation by providing for alimony to a necessitous husband when
Article 160 specifically addressed the wife's needs. A new majority agreed
with this contention and held Article 160 to be unconstitutional-effectively removing the legislative source of alimony for any necessitous
spouse. Tate adopted the reasoning of the original majority 3 and noted
that legislative silence as to post-divorce alimony for husbands would
have allowed the courts to use Article 21 to provide a gender-neutral
rule in accordance with the Code's general principle of equity.
The last law-making function of the judge, analysis of policy interests
in spite of the literal wording of an article, 4 overlaps with the three
other functions. Recognizing that the legislative will is of primary importance, Tate argued that this will must be obeyed even if the words
of a statute dictate otherwise. According to Tate,
the words of legislation contain a prihciple of regulation intended
by the legislators to apply to contemplated norms of their own
and succeeding times. But if there is a substantial change in the
social conditions the statute is designed to regulate, the mechanical adjudication by reference to the statute's literal wording
alone may, under the changed conditions, amount to an irresponsible application of a legal rule devised neither by legislative
intention nor by the deciding court. 5
Despite this seemingly broad and sweeping language, Tate also believed
that this type of interpretation must be used sparingly and with restraint-and never as an excuse to thwart the legislative will. That is,
the policies and preferences of the judge, under the guise of interpretation, cannot be substituted for those of the legislature.
Fidelity to the above-stated principle does not guarantee unanimous
agreement among judges as to the legislative will. For example, in
Tannehill v. Tannehill,'6 Justice Tate, then sitting on the Third Circuit,
was faced with the issue of whether a father could allege sterility as
ground for disavowal. At that time the Civil Code listed five grounds
for disavowal, none of which were sterility. This list of grounds had
been held to be exclusive in the supreme court decision of Williams v.

13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 317.
28 La. L. Rev. at 227.
Id.at 229.
226 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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Williams.17 On the other hand, several scholars, including Justice Tate,
had under different circumstances, criticized the rigid construction of
the paternity and disavowal articles. In this instance, however, Tate
concluded, "[tihe general statutory intent ... is to protect helpless
children born during a marriage from illegitimation by one or both of
their parents or by others for their own selfish aims."'" Tate rejected
this type of application in another case where the child would be deprived
of his right.' 9
The supreme court affirmed Tate's decision in Tannehill, agreeing
with his opinion as to the legislative will. 20 This writer, however, dissented, finding that the legislative intent was to allow disavowal based
on "unnatural impotence" by negative inference from former Article
185 .21 Having concluded that sterility due to a childhood disease was
not a "natural impotence," the father was allowed his cause of action.
This writer noted:
Not only do I disagree with the result and with the historical
interpretation given to Article 185 of our Civil Code, but I
strongly take issue with the majority's method and technique of
judicial interpretation. The use of exegetical approach in isolation
does not discharge the judicial obligation when our court works
to and through the Code. While exegesis is certainly helpful,
often very enlightening, it can entomb the court and the law in
the darkness of the past. The combination of the exegetical, the
empirical, and the functional methods of interpretation is required in order that the law serve the people, that the law be
a reflection of the people's understanding, desires, and needs.
Moreover, the more comprehensive approach is required under
the mandate of our Code itself:
'Art. 18. The universal and most effectual way of discovering
the true meaning of a law, when its expressions are dubious,
is considering the reason and spirit of it, or the cause which
induced the Legislature to enact it.'
'Art. 3. Customs result from a long series of actions constantly
repeated, which have by such repetition, and by uninterrupted
acquiescence, acquired the force of a tacit and common consent.'

17. 87 So. 2d 707 (La. 1956).
18. Tannehill, at 189.
19. Id. (citing George v. Bertrand, 217 So. 2d 47, 49 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) (Tate,
J.,dissenting)).
20. 261 So. 2d 619 (La. 1972).
21. That article read in pertinent part: "The husband cannot by alleging his natural
impotence, disown the child ......
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'Art. 21. In all civil matters, where there is no express law,
the judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity.
To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law
and reason, or received usages where positive law is silent.'
22
(Emphasis supplied.)
As it turned out, the legislature itself was the final arbiter of this
debate-although not of the case. In 1976, it revised the paternity and
disavowal articles to allow the husband to "disavow paternity of a child
if he proves by a preponderance of the evidence any facts which reasonably indicate that he is not the father. ' 23 All of the opinions in
Tannehill sought to propagate the legislature's intent, yet reached different conclusions, exemplifying the difficulty of this type of judicial
interpretation and the need to use it sparingly.
Justice Tate also authored a body of work expounding upon those
aspects of the judicial function that are uniquely civilian. 24 Acknowledging the obvious similarities between Louisiana and common law
judges, he went on to examine the subtle differences between the two
philosophies. 25 For example, a civil law judge is less hesitant than a
common law judge to overrule a precedent. At least in theory, a lower
civilian court could even overrule a higher court decision if it believed
that decision to be erroneous. Although Tate believed in this distinction
and expounded on it in his articles, he could not escape the influence
of his common law training. More often than not, he would distinguish
a case rather than overrule it, and when he sat on the court of appeals,
26
he acknowledged the authority of a supreme court decision.
Another attribute of Louisiana jurisprudence is its ability to develop
an entire body of law using the Codal principles, yet following the caseby-case method. This writer collaborated with Justice Tate in an article
which made this point, citing the body of mineral law which was formed
almost entirely prior to the adoption of the mineral code. 27 We opined:
The evolvement of the mineral law over the years indicates the
court's awareness of new developments in that field and of the
need for flexible rules of law which could be adapted to changing

22. 261 So. 2d at 627 (Barham, J., dissenting).
23. La. Civ. Code art. 187.
24. See, e.g., Tate, Civilian Methodology in Louisiana, 44 Tul. L. Rev. 673 (1970);
Barham & Tate, Jurisprudential Development in Louisiana Civil Law, 34 La. L. Rev.
953 (1974); Tate, The Role of the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions: The Louisiana Experience,
20 Loy. L. Rev. 231 (1974).
25. Tate, Civilian Methodology in Louisiana, 44 Tul. L. Rev. 673, 677 (1970).
26. For example, in Tannehill, 226 So. 2d at 189, he stated, "We are unwilling to
depart from this settled guiding principle, in the absence of direction from our Supreme
Court to the contrary."
27. Barham & Tate, supra note 24.
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conditions .... This jurisprudence is a good example of the
civilian tradition of looking not only to the Code, but through
and beyond the Code. It has to date kept that Code and the
2s
mineral law alive and viable.
This type of faith in and adherence to the Code as a tool to facilitate
justice distinguished Tate from most of his colleagues, who preferred
to abandon the civilian methodology in favor of common law practice.
According to Tate, the Louisiana judge possesses the best of both
worlds.2 9 On the one hand he is not bound by case law if he feels that
a Code article has been misinterpreted or if no article exists at all. The
general codal principles remain available to him. On the other hand,
the body of opinions are invaluable sources of reasoning which guide
the judge in reaching a decision. Perhaps Justice Tate struck a balance
between these two competing systems by realizing the full power of
civilian methodology, yet reserving that power when a common law
approach would suffice. As with the constitutional concept of judicial
review, the strength of the concept is preserved by its sparing use.
In addition to Justice Tate's contributions of judicial opinions and
scholarly articles, 0 he was also a prominent source of the written law.
As a delegate to the Convention which drafted the 1974 Louisiana
Constitution, he served as the chairman for style and drafting. He was
recognized by the Convention as having great constitutional expertise,
and he was a persuasive member of the Convention. Additionally, Justice
Tate served the Louisiana State Law Institute and was responsible for
many contributions to the revisions of the Civil Code of Louisiana. He
was a member of the American Law Institute and a director of the
American Judicature Society. He was chairman of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana and chairman of the Louisiana Conference of
Court of Appeal Judges. He served as chairman of the executive committee of the National Appellate Judges Conference and as chairman
of the American Bar Associate Committee on Appellate Advocacy. He
has contributed much to the national court system of state judges, to
the American Bar Foundation and the National Appellate Judges Seminar. In recognition of these achievements, the legislature passed a concurrent resolution by 106 representatives and 39 senators, during its 1986
Regular Session "to express the condolences of the Legislature upon

28. Id. at 954.
29. Tate, The Role of the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions: The Louisiana Experience,
20 Loy. L. Rev. 231 (1974).
30. He was the author of more than fifty major articles published in law reviews,
bar journals and books. He authored a textbook on Louisiana Civil Procedure. He served
as a Professor of Law at LSU on a leave of absence from the Third Circuit Court of
Appeal. He continued over the years to lecture, not only at LSU, but at other law schools
in the state.
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the recent death of Judge Albert Tate, Jr., one of Louisiana's greatest
sons."31

Justice Tate has received many honors, both while he was alive and
posthumously. However, the highest honor and that of which he would
be most proud, would be to remember him in practice by striving for
excellence with the same vigor and dedication that he displayed.

31.

House Concurrent Resolution No. 134, Regular Session 1986.

